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Abstract—RPL is the emerging routing standard for low power
and lossy networks (LLNs). LLN is a key component of the
Internet of Things (IoT), hence its security is imperative for
the age of IoT. In this work, we present the DAO induction
attack, a novel attack against RPL. In this attack, a malicious
insider or a compromised node periodically increments its DTSN
number. Each such increment can trigger/induce a large number
of control message transmissions in the network. We show that
this degrades the network performance in terms of end-to-end
latency, packet loss ratio, and power consumption. To mitigate,
we propose a lightweight solution to detect the DAO induction
attack. Our solution imposes nearly no overhead on IoT devices,
which is important as these devices are typically constrained in
terms of power, memory and processing.
Index Terms—Internet of things, low power and lossy net-
works, security, RPL.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology
which envisions to connect billions of “things” to the Internet.
This enables numerous applications in diverse areas such as
smart home, e-Health, and smart city. Low-power and Lossy
Networks (LLNs) play an indispensable role in realizing IoT.
These networks are typically composed of constrained devices
with limited power, memory and processing. In addition,
LLNs suffer from high packet loss rates and low throughput.
These characteristics and limitations make designing routing
protocols for LLNs challenging.
ROLL, a working group of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), evaluated the common standard routing pro-
tocols of the Internet and concluded that these protocols
are not suitable for LLNs because of their heavy overhead.
Consequently, the ROLL group designed the IPv6 Routing
Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) [1] to
meet the low overhead requirement of LLNs.
Because of limited resources, nodes in LLNs are unable to
run and benefit from complex security solutions such as those
that use assymetric cryptography. This makes RPL vulnerable
to a range of attacks [2]–[10]. An internal attacker may alter,
inject, replay, and generate data or control messages to impact
the normal operation of RPL networks. For example, in the
version number attack [6], a malicious insider node initiates an
unnecessary global network repair process by increasing the
version number. Another example, albeit with lower impact,
is the DAO insider attack [3] in which the attacker repeatedly
sends DAO control messages to the root, causing wasteful
transmissions by the nodes on the path from the attacker to
the root.
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In this work, we present the DAO induction attack, a novel
attack in which a malicious insider node induces nodes to
transmit unnecessary DAO control messages. Similar to the
version number attack, the DAO induction attack can cause
a large number of transmissions in the network. Unlike the
version number attack, the DAO induction attack may not be
detectable by the root of the network, as will be explained
later.
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We introduce the DAO induction attack, a novel attack
against the RPL protocol.
• We evaluate the impact of the DAO induction attack on
power consumption, communications overhead, latency,
and packet loss ratio.
• We propose a lightweight solution to detect the DAO
induction attack. Our solution is fully compatible with
the RPL protocol, and imposes nearly no overhead on
IoT devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides an overview of the RPL routing protocol. The
adversary model is given in Section III. Section IV de-
scribes the DAO induction attack. Section V evaluates the
attack’s impact on the network performance. Section VI briefly
overviews the existing mitigation techniques, and proposes a
new lightweight solution to detect the DAO induction attack.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RPL PROTOCOL
RPL is a distance-vector routing protocol, which can operate
on various link layer standards including Bluetooth and IEEE
802.15.4 [11]. RPL builds one or more Destination Oriented
Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG), a loop free topology as
shown in Fig. 1. DODAG has a single root as a destination
node with no outgoing edges. The root acts as the data sink
of DODAG. Each DODAG is specified by an instance ID, a
DODAG ID, and a version number.
RPL uses DODAG to support three different traffic patterns:
multipoint-to-point (MP2P) from end nodes to the root, point-
to-multipoint (P2MP) from root to end nodes, and point-to-
point (P2P) traffic. The DODAG structure is built step by step.
To this end, nodes periodically transmit a control message
called Destination Information Object (DIO). DIO messages
contain important information including an objective function
to calculate rank, a number that determines a node’s position
with respect to the root. Ranks monotonically increase in the
downward direction (i.e., towards leaf nodes), and are used to
avoid loops.
After receiving a DIO message from a lower rank node,
the receiving node adds the address of the DIO sender to its
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Fig. 1. An example of a RPL DODAG. Solid lines show each node’s preferred
parents, and dashed lines show node’s other DAO parents. For instance,
{N3, N6, N8} is the parent set of N5, and N3 is the preferred parent of
N5.
candidate parent set, and calculates its rank with respect to
the new candidate parent. The candidate parent that results in
the best rank is selected as the node’s preferred parent. At the
end of this procedure, each node has upward paths towards
the root (through its parents).
DIO messages are periodically sent by nodes according to
a trickle timer. If a new node wants to join the network, it
should receive a DIO message to obtain DODAG information.
If the new node does not receive a DIO message, it can send
a DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) message requesting
DODAG information. When an existing node in the network
receives a DIS message, it replies by transmitting a DIO
message.
To support downward routs (i.e. routs from the root), RPL
uses another type of control message called Destination Ad-
vertisement Object (DAO). A node that wants to be reachable
by the root advertises its address in a DAO message, and sends
it to one of its DAO parents. The course of action taken by the
node’s DAO parent depends on the RPL mode of operation.
RPL supports two modes of operation: storing (table-driven)
and non-storing (source routing). In the storing mode, all non-
leaf nodes maintain a routing table for destinations, while in
the non-storing mode only the root maintains a routing table.
In both modes, a node that receives a DAO message forwards it
to one of its DAO parents; this ensures that the DAO message
is ultimately received by the root. In storing mode, a node
updates its routing table before forwarding the DAO message.
This update is not required in the non-storing mode as non-
root nodes do not maintain any routing table.
In the non-storing mode, P2P packets travel up from the
source all the way to the root and then travel down to the
destination. In the storing mode, however, a P2P packet can
start traveling down towards the destination as soon as it
reaches a common ancestor of the source and the destination.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that RPL is either in no-secure mode, or uses
a shared secret key (at the link-layer or by itself) to secure
its messages. In either case, nodes cannot authenticate the
root’s messages, as every node uses the same secret key.
We assume that the adversary controls a single insider node
(e.g. a compromised node), hence knows the network’s secret
key. We refer to the node controlled by the adversary as the
malicious node. The malicious node can be any node in the
network except the root. In this work, we limit the malicious
node’s misbehaviour to 1) running the DAO induction attack
(explained next), and 2) selectively dropping DAO packets to
avoid detection by the root. Attacks combining the DAO in-
duction attack with other existing ones can be more powerful,
and lie outside the scope of this work.
IV. THE DAO INDUCTION ATTACK
In RPL, each node maintains a DAO Trigger Sequence
Number (DTSN), and reports it in its DIO messages. If a node
receives a DIO message from one of its DAO parents, and
realizes that the parent has incremented its DTSN, the node
must schedule a DAO transmission. In non-storing mode, the
node must in addition increment its own DTSN. Therefore,
in this mode, a DTSN increment by a node will cause all its
descendants to increment their DTSN in turn, triggering DAO
transmissions from the entire sub-DODAG.
In DAO induction attack, a malicious insider node repeat-
edly increases its DTSN to trigger DAO transmissions. This
can cause many transmissions particularly in the non-storing
mode (a common mode of operation as many IoT devices
are too constrained to operate in the storing mode [1]) as
all descendants of the malicious node transmit each time the
malicious node increments its DTSN. To avoid detection by
the root, the attacker can simply refrain from forwarding DAO
message of its descendants to the root.
The DTSN counter is an 8-bit unsigned integer, so it has
a limited range. This limitation, however, does not restrict
the number of times a malicious node can update DTSN in
a DAO induction attack. This is because in RPL, sequence
counters operate according to a ‘lollipop’ fashion [12], where
an increment of a sequence number with the maximum value
will wrap the number back to zero. Therefore, the number of
times an attacker can increment DTSN is practically unlimited.
Similar to the version number and DAO insider attacks, the
DAO induction attack can be mitigated by enabling security
mechanisms at the link-layer or at RPL itself. However, these
mechanisms are ineffective when the attacker is an insider or
a compromised node.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
To evaluate the impact of the DAO induction attack on the
network’s performance, we performed a diverse set of simu-
lations using the Contiki operating system [13], a lightweight
and open-source operating system designed for IoT.
A. Simulation settings
We used the Tmote Sky mote, which is an MSP430-based
board benefiting from a radio chip compatible with the IEEE
802.15.4 link layer protocol. We employed this mote for all the
nodes including the malicious node. To implement the DAO
induction attack, we modified the RPL protocol stack of the
Contiki OS on the malicious node. Similar to other nodes,
the malicious node joins the network and actively participates
in the creation and maintenance of the DODAG. The main
difference between the malicious node and the others is that
3TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS SETTINGS
Simulation parameters Value
Simulation time 1800s
Radio medium Unit Disk Graph Medium
Topology dimension 150m× 150m
Number of nodes 20, 30, 40, and 50
Modes of operation Storing and Non-storing
Transmission range 40m
Interference range 80m
Traffic rate per node 1 packet per minute
Node type Tmote Sky
Number of simulations 10 per each topology
link layer protocol IEEE 802.15.4
MAC protocol CSMA-CA
it is programmed to periodically increment its DTSN number,
and send it in a DIO message to its neighbours. To evaluate
the maximum impact of the DAO induction attack in the non-
storing mode, we selected the malicious node randomly from
the neighbours of the root. Note that these nodes have the
maximum number of descendants among all non-root nodes.
We considered a sample scenario in which nodes are dis-
tributed randomly in a 150m × 150m square area network.
Each node is static and transmits one data packet of 50 bytes to
the root every 60 seconds. To simulate link failure, we used the
Unit DISK Graph Model (UDGM). We evaluated the impacts
of the DAO attack on the following metrics.
• DAO overhead: the total number of DAO transmissions
including transmissions of original DAO messages as well
as transmissions for forwarding DAO messages towards
the root.
• Average power consumption: the average consumed
power by each node in the network.
• Packet loss ratio: the packet loss ratio averaged over all
the node in the network. The packet loss ratio of a node
is one minus the ratio of the number of received packets
by the DODAG root from that node over the total number
of packets sent by the node.
• Average Latency: the average end-to-end latency of all
packets successfully received by the root.
B. Impact of the DAO induction attack
Fig. 2 shows the total number of DAO transmissions (i.e.,
the DAO overhead) for both RPL modes of operation. As
shown, the DAO induction attack significantly increases the
DAO overhead in both storing and non-storing modes. In larger
networks, this overhead is higher: When there is no attack, the
DAO overhead increases slowly with the number of nodes.
Under the DAO induction attack, however, the DAO overhead
grows at a significantly higher rate. Note that, the impact of
the DAO induction attack is higher in the non-storing mode
than the storing mode. This is expected because, in the non-
storing mode, a DTSN increment triggers all the nodes in the
attacker’s sub-DODAG to transmit DAO messages.
Fig. 3 shows the average power consumption of nodes when
the network is under the DAO induction attack. To calculate
the average power consumption, we used the collect-view
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Fig. 2. The impact of the DAO induction attack on the number of DAO
transmissions in the storing and non-storing modes.
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Fig. 3. The impact of the DAO induction attack on the average power
consumption in the storing and non-storing modes.
feature available in Contiki. As shown, the power consumption
increase because of the DAO induction attack is more notice-
able in the non-storing mode than in the storing mode. This is
expected because, in the non-storing, the attack engages more
nodes and generates more overhead.
Fig. 4 shows the impact of the DAO induction attack on the
average end-to-end latency. As shown in the figure, the DAO
induction attack significantly increases the average end-to-end
delay in the network. This increase is considerably higher
in the non-storing mode than the storing mode. Again, the
underlying reason is that the DAO induction attack engages
more nodes and creates more overhead in the non-storing
mode.
Finally, the impact of the DAO attack on the packet loss
ratio is shown in Fig. 5. This impact is insignificant in small
networks particularly in the storing mode. The impact is,
however, considerable in networks with about 40 and more
nodes. As in the previous cases, the DAO induction attack is
more severe in the non-storing mode than in the storing mode.
VI. MITIGATION
Following, we first enumerate the existing mitigation so-
lutions by categorizing them into two classes: proactive and
reactive. We then present our solution to detect the DAO in-
duction attack. This solution, unlike the existing ones, imposes
nearly no overhead on IoT devices, which is important as these
devices typically have limited resources.
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Fig. 4. The impact of the DAO induction attack on the average end-to-end
latency in the storing and non-storing modes.
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Fig. 5. The impact of the DAO induction attack on the packet loss ratio in
the storing and non-storing modes.
A. Proactive solutions
Proactive solutions aim to eliminate the possibility of the
attack completely. Recall that the impact of the DAO induction
attack is significantly more severe in the non-storing mode than
the storing mode. Theretofore, it is more important to mitigate
this attack in the non-storing mode.
In the non-storing mode, the DAO induction attack is similar
to the version number attack as both the version number
and DTSN must be first incremented by the root. Hence
both attacks can be prevented if root’s messages can be
authenticated. Authentication can be achieved using digital
signatures, or hash chains as described below.
1) Digital signatures: the conventional way to provide
authentication is by digital signatures. Use of digital signatures
in IoT networks is challenging. First challenge is to securely
distribute the root’s public key. Currently, manual installation
is the only feasible method to distribute security keys among
constrained devices [14]. Another major challenge is that exist-
ing digital signature methods are computationally heavy [15].
2) Hash-chain: as used in VeRA [7], hash chains can be
used for authentication. Similar to digital signatures, hash
chain based solutions impose communication and computation
overheads even in normal conditions when network is under
no attack. More importantly, for this solutions to work, the
root of the hash chain must be securely distributed. In the
absence of computationally heavy asymmetric cryptography
operations – as constrained nodes have difficulty performing
R
Fig. 6. An example of a DODAG under the DAO induction attack by node
A. Node “P” is the preferred parent and node “DP” is the DAO parent of
node “L” respectively.
these operations – the daunting manual installation seems to
be the only feasible option.
B. Reactive solutions
Reactive solutions, unlike proactive ones, do not eliminate
the possibility of the attack. Instead, they aim to detect and
mitigate the attack upon detection. A reactive security solution
consists of two phases: detection and reaction. The aim of the
first phase is to detect the onset of the attack by monitoring the
network. When an attack is detected, the solution goes to the
reaction phase where the attacking node is isolated/removed.
Monitoring of the network can be performed by either the
internal IoT nodes, or external monitoring nodes. Each of
these approaches have their own issues. The former approach
imposes overheads on IoT devices, which is not desirable if
they are power constrained (e.g., when they run on batteries).
The latter approach can be costly particularly when multiple
external monitoring nodes are needed.
Our proposed monitoring solution, presented next, uses the
root node for detecting the DAO attack, and imposes nearly no
overhead on IoT devices. In addition, simulation results show
that our solution has a high detection rate.
C. Our proposed detection solution
As mentioned earlier, the existing solutions all impose
overhead even in normal condition when the network is under
no attack. Our detection solution, however, imposes nearly no
overhead.
Our solution requires IoT nodes to follow two simple rules,
both supported by the RPL protocol. First, each node should
select up to two non-preferred parent nodes, whenever such
nodes exist. Second, each node should schedule its DAO
transmission to be forwarded to its preferred DAO parent when
it hears a DTSN increment by a non-preferred parent.
Let us use an example to explain why following these rules
helps the root to detect the DAO induction attack. Consider
the sample network shown in Fig. 6. Node A is the attacker,
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Fig. 7. The detection ratio of the DAO induction attack when RPL nodes
have more than one DAO parent. Each RPL node are able to choose k extra
DAO parents.
and the network operates in the non-storing mode. Notice that
node L has two DAO parents: the preferred parent P , and the
non-preferred parent DP . When the attacker A increments its
DTSN, all its descendants including node DP increment their
DTSN in turn, and report this change through DIO messages.
When node L hears DP ’s DIO message, it schedules a DAO
transmissions through its preferred parent P instead of DP .
This DAO message cannot be dropped by the attacker as it
does not go through the attacker. The root will then receive
the DAO message and detect the DAO induction attack as
it did not start the DTSN increment1. Note that when the
DTSN increment is legitimate (i.e., it is started by the root), all
the nodes in the network will schedule a DAO transmission.
Therefore, following the aforementioned rules does not impose
any extra overhead on IoT devices.
To detect the DAO induction attack, the network should
have a node (like L) with two DAO parrents; one in the
attacker’s sub-DODAG, and the preferred one outside the
attacker’s sub-DODAG. An interesting question is how often
such a node exists. To answer this question, we run simulations
using the Contiki operating system. We changed the RPL
setting of Contiki, to allow nodes select more than one DAO
parent whenever possible.
Let u1, u2, . . . , un be the set of non-root IoT nodes, and di,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a binary number, such that it is equal to 1 iff a
DAO induction attack by node ui is detectable. The detection
rate is calculated as the weighted average of di, where weight
of di is the number of descendants of ui (i.e., the number of
nodes that are affected by the DAO attack launched by ui).
For a given network size, the detection rate is calculated for
ten different networks of that size. Fig. 7. shows the average
of these ten detection rates for network size of 20, 30, 40
and 50. In the figure, k indicates the number of non-preferred
DAO parents that each RPL node can have. For instances,
for k = 1, each node selects exactly one non-preferred DAO
parent whenever possible. As shown, the detection rate of our
solution is close to 100% if nodes select two non-preferred
DAO parents whenever possible.
1Note that a single bit in DAO message can indicate that the message was
generated as the result of a DTSN increment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the DAO induction attack, a
novel security attack against the RPL protocol in which a ma-
licious insider node increments its DTSN number periodically
to flood the network with control messages. Through various
simulations, we showed that the attack adversely impacts net-
work performance, and power consumption particularly when
the network operates in the non-storing mode. To mitigate,
we proposed a lightweight detection solution that imposes
nearly no overhead on IoT devices. Simulation results show
that our solution can detect the DAO induction attack with
high probability.
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